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an analysis of the data collected by the UN’s COI team, the UN declared that while
it found crimes against humanity had been committed by the government of Sudan
(GoS) and the Janjaweed (Arab militia), it did not find evidence that the GoS had
perpetrated genocide. Herein, Samuel Totten, argues that a correct analysis of the
data collected by the COI team would have been genocide. In addition to offering a
critique of the COI’s analysis, Totten is critical of the hurried, unsystematic, and
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Introduction
This article presents a critical analysis of the United Nations Commission of Inquiry
(COI) into the conflict in Darfur—a conflict in which government of Sudan (GoS)
troops and Janjaweed (Arab militia) carried out a scorched-earth policy that resulted
in the deaths of tens of thousands of people and the displacement of well over two and
a half million people from their villages and homes. Following the delineation of key
background information vis-a`-vis the inquiry, the major finding of the COI is dis-
cussed: that crimes against humanity had been perpetrated in Darfur but not geno-
cide. Arguing from the position that genocide had, in fact, been perpetrated, I analyze
three possibilities as to why the COI did not come to a finding of genocide: politics, a
sloppy and incomplete investigation, and an inadequate analysis of the facts.
Background to the Commission of Inquiry into Darfur
Following a US State Department-sponsored investigation in which over 1,100 black
African refugees from Darfur were interviewed in refugee camps along the Chad/
Darfur border, US Secretary of State Colin Powell declared, on 9 September 2004,
that ‘‘based on a consistent and widespread pattern of atrocities—killings, rapes,
burning of villages—committed by the Janjaweed and government [of Sudan] forces
against non-Arab villagers’’ [Massaleit, Zaghawa and Fur], the State Department
had concluded that ‘‘genocide has been committed—and genocide may still be occur-
ring.’’1 Subsequently, the US referred the matter to the United Nations and called on
it to undertake ‘‘a full-blown and unfettered investigation.’’2
Acting under Chapter VII of the United Nations Charter, the UN Security Coun-
cil, on 18 September 2004, adopted Resolution 1564 which called on UN Secretary
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General Kofi Annan ‘‘to rapidly establish an international commission of inquiry in
order to investigate reports of violations of international humanitarian law and
human rights law in Darfur by all parties, to determine also whether or not acts of
genocide have occurred.’’3
In October 2004, Secretary General Kofi Annan appointed the Commission of
Inquiry, naming as chairperson Antonio Cassese, the former president of the UN’s
International Criminal Tribunal for the former Yugoslavia (ICTY). Annan asked that
the members of the COI provide him with a report of their findings within three
months’ time.
The COI’s team comprised thirteen members: a chief investigator, four additional
investigators; two female investigators ‘‘with a specialty in gender violence’’;4 four
forensic experts; and two military analysts. Various commission members and com-
mission staff were also involved in visits to Sudan, Chad, and other parts of the
region. Ultimately, the data collected by the COI team were analyzed by the COI
Commission members, with the assistance of five legal researchers and one political
affairs officer.
Unlike the United States Atrocities Documentation Project (ADP), which was
limited to conducting its investigation in refugee camps in Chad, the COI conducted
a far broader investigation that included the three states of Darfur (including towns,
villages, and internally displaced persons camps); Khartoum, the capital of Sudan;
refugee camps in Chad; Eritrea (in order to meet with representatives of two rebel
groups—the Sudanese Liberation Movement/Army [SLM/A] and the Justice and
Equality Movement [JEM]); and Addis Ababa (in order to meet with officials of the
African Union).
The COI team carried out its investigation in November and December 2004 and
January 2005. Over and above determining whether or not acts of genocide had been
perpetrated, the Commission’s mandate included three other major tasks: ‘‘to investi-
gate reports of violations of international humanitarian law and human rights law in
Darfur by all parties; to identity the perpetrators of violations of international human-
itarian law and human rights law; and to suggest means of ensuring that those re-
sponsible for such violations are held accountable.’’5
Major UN COI Finding—Crimes against Humanity, Not Genocide
Based on its investigation and analysis of the data collected, the COI came to the
determination that the government of Sudan and the Janjaweed were responsible for
carrying out a scorched earth policy in Darfur. In doing so, the COI concluded that
GoS forces and the Janjaweed
conducted indiscriminate attacks, including killing of civilians, torture, enforced dis-
appearances, destruction of villages, rape and other forms of sexual violence, pillaging
and forced displacement, throughout Darfur. These acts were conducted on a wide-
spread adsystematic basis, and therefore amount to crimes against humanity. The ex-
tensive destruction and displacement have resulted in a loss of livelihood and means of
survival for countless women, men and children. The vast majority of the victims of all
of these violations have been from the Fur, Zaghawa, Masaslit, Jebel, Aranga, and
other so-called African tribes.6
In its report, the COI delineated a battery of criminal acts perpetrated by the GoS and
the Janjaweed, including but not limited to the following:
e ‘‘According to some estimates over 700 villages in all three states of Darfur
have been completely or partially destroyed. The Commission further received
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information that the [local] police had made an assessment of the destruction
and recorded the number of destroyed villages at over 2000.’’7e ‘‘Many villages are said to have been attacked more than once, until they were
completely destroyed.’’8e Unlike the black African tribes, most of the other tribes in the area—the Arab
tribes—‘‘have not been targeted, if targeted at all.’’9e Attacks involved air bombardments and the use of Mi-8 helicopters, Mi-24
helicopters, and Antonov aircraft.10e ‘‘The large number of killings, the apparent pattern of killing . . . including
the targeting of persons belonging to African tribes and the participation of
officials or authorities are amongst the factors that led the Commission to the
conclusion that killings were conducted in both a widespread and systematic
manner.’’11e Many of the attacks involved the killing of civilians, including women and
children.12e There was widespread rape and other serious forms of violence committed
against women and girls in all three states of Darfur.13e ‘‘In addition to homes, all essential structures and implements for the survival
of the population were also destroyed. Oil presses, flour mills, water sources
such as wells and pumps, crops and vegetation and almost all household
utensils were found scorched or smashed at the sites inspected.’’14e ‘‘The Janjaweed took everything [the Black Africans] owned, involving all goods
necessary to sustain life in the difficult conditions in Darfur, including . . .
livestock, representing the key source of income of the affected people.’’15e ‘‘[T]he Commission finds that pillaging, being conducted on a systematic as well
as a widespread basis mainly against African tribes, was discriminatory and
calculated to bring about the destruction of livelihoods and the means of
survival of the affected populations.’’16e Black African females were forced to ‘‘take off their maxi (large piece of cloth-
ing covering the entire body), and if they [the perpetrators] found that they
were holding their young sons under them, they would kill the boys.’’17
(UNCOI, 2005, paragraph 272)e In certain instances, the GoS and Janjaweed carried out large scale massacres
of men (reportedly ‘‘mainly intellectuals and leaders’’).18e Black African civilians were killed after they reached IDP camps.19
In light of the fact that it seems apparent that the the GoS and Janjaweed carried
out such atrocities with the intent, at least to a certain extent, to destroy the black
Africans of Darfur in whole or in part, numerous scholars and human rights acti-
vists20 have questioned why and how the COI concluded, based on the evidence it
collected, that the GoS did not ‘‘pursue a policy of genocide.’’21 That is not to say that
the COI neglected to provide a rationale for its determination, for it did (see below);
rather, for many, the rationale was not convincing and thus questions have been
raised about the logic of (and/or politics and/or bias behind) the rationale vis-a`-vis the
final determination.
A Determination That Was Possibly Politically Influenced and/or Biased
Some scholars suspect that Egypt might have been, at least in part, behind the COI’s
determination that the GoS had not perpetrated genocide in Darfur.22 First, they
note, Egypt vigorously defended Sudan’s sovereignty despite the atrocities perpe-
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trated by GoS troops and the Janjaweed in Darfur; and second, a powerful and
influential Egyptian, Mr. Mohammed Fayek, was one of the five COI Commissioners.
Eric Reeves spelled out some of the main concerns that have been voiced about
Egypt and its relationship with Sudan as it relates to the crisis in Darfur:
Few countries have provided more diplomatic or political cover for the NIF regime
[than Egypt], particularly in its efforts to forestall humanitarian intervention. Cairo
has offered an unqualified defense of Sudan’s claim to national sovereignty (Egyptian
Foreign Minister Ahmed Aboul Gheit insisted last month that Khartoum would have
to approve the dispatch of U.N. troops to Darfur). And so long as Khartoum can count
on Egyptian support, it can count on support from the Arab League as a whole. The
group has served mainly as an extension of Egyptian foreign policy (it was no surprise
last week when former Egyptian Foreign Minister Amr Moussa was named to a second
five-year term as secretary general).23
Whether or not Egypt or Fayek actually influenced the COI determination is hardly
conclusive, but that is not to say that it didn’t happen. Additional digging among re-
searchers is needed before such a conclusion can be made.
On a different note, at least one major figure with the COI, Antonio Cassese,
seemingly had a preconceived notion as to what the data collected by the COI would
add up to in the end. Whether it was a politically motivated opinion or a quick and
dirty analysis on his part is hard to tell. More specifically, Debb Bodkin, a police
officer based in Canada and the only person who served as an investigator with the
US Atrocities Documentation Project and the UN’s COI, told this author that while
the COI team was in Geneva for its initial briefing prior to flying to Darfur, Antonio
Cassese seemingly suggested that the COI would not result in a finding of genocide.
In regard to this matter, Bodkin reported the following:
Commissioner Antonio Cassese, who had traveled to Khartoum and some parts of
Darfur for a few days and had conducted some interviews, stated that he felt that we
would find that there were two elements of genocide missing: (A) target group (assert-
ing that the victims were from mixed tribes, not a single one) and (B) mens rea (the
actual intent to destroy in whole or in part). He talked for a while and my personal
opinion was that he was telling us that the outcome of the investigation would show
that it was not genocide, which was occurring. He did not specify how long he had
visited or how many interviews he had conducted but I don’t believe either was
extensive. I felt it was very inappropriate for him to plant this opinion in the investiga-
tors’ minds prior to starting the investigation and other investigators felt uncomfort-
able about it as well.24
It is possible, of course, that Cassese was simply offering a casual hypothesis with
no intention of swaying the investigators’ thoughts and actions. Whether or not that
was the case, it was not a wise way to begin an investigation in which objectivity
should have been paramount. No matter what, it raises a red flag in regard to how
the data were ultimately analyzed and whether the COI (or at least certain members
of the team responsible for conducting an analysis of the data) was, in one way or
another, biased against a determination of genocide. If such a bias existed, then the
investigation was compromised from the start.
A Rushed and Seemingly Unsystematic Investigation
Based on a careful reading of the COI report and a first-person report by one of the
COI investigators there is no doubt that the investigation was understaffed, hurried,
and rather unsystematic.
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At the outset of the COI report, the authors comment on the constraints faced by
the investigatory team:
There is no denying that while the various task assigned to the Commission are com-
plex and unique, the Commission was called upon to discharge them under difficult
conditions. First of all, it operated under serious time constraints. [Second,] given
that the Security Council had decided that the Commission must act urgently, the
Secretary-General requested that the Commission report to him within three months
of its establishment. The fulfillment of its complex tasks, in particular those concerning
the findings of serious violations and the identification of perpetrators, required the
Commission to work intensely and under heavy time pressure.25
This statement raises a host of critical issues that not only call into question the seri-
ousness with which the UN undertook its investigation and its commitment to truly
discovering the full extent of the nature of the crimes committed by the GoS and the
Janjaweed, but, ultimately, the validity of the Commission’s findings. In light of the
seriousness of the investigation (ascertaining whether genocide had been perpetrated
or not), it is unfathomable why the investigatory team would be forced to work under
‘‘serious time constraints’’ and under ‘‘heavy time pressure.’’26 From the very outset,
both Secretary General Kofi Annan and the Commissioners had to know that a rushed
investigation would result in an incomplete study. As cynical as it sounds, one has to
question whether that was the intent.
A key question that arises is: Why was there was such a rush to complete the
investigation?27 This is a major concern, particularly in light of the fact that the UN
ostensibly did not perceive a need to undertake the investigation until prodded to do
so by the United States (in other words, the UN was hardly proactive in this regard).28
If such an investigation was so critical to conduct—and in such a timely fashion—
then why wasn’t it undertaken a lot sooner? Indeed, why did the UN wait until until
two years into the crisis, by which time an estimated 180,000 plus people had already
been killed and over 1 million people had been forced from their villages into IDP or
refugee camps?29
Furthermore, it is a fact that once the investigation was completed, the UN did
not show a real sense of urgency in prodding the GoS to halt the killing, and
ongoing rape. Yes, it passed one resolution after another, but it could not seem to
find the political will to force the GoS to comply with key UN requests and demands
inherent in the resolutions.30 And while some sanctions were issued, they were rela-
tively soft sanctions and hardly implemented in a way that spoke to their seriousness.
The UN also did not display a sense of urgency in attempting to find a way to provide
real protection for the black Africans of Darfur—not for those still residing in villages
or for those eking out a mean existence in IDP camps, both of which continued to be
viciously attacked by the GoS and the Janjaweed over the years.31
On a related note, the COI report states that ‘‘both [the COI’s] fact-finding mission
and its task of identifying perpetrators would have benefited from the assistance of a
great number32 of investigators, lawyers, military analysts, and forensic experts. The
Commission’s budget, [however,] did not allow for more than thirteen such experts.’’33
It is not a little perplexing as to why such a significant undertaking was underfunded
to the point that it could not hire the full complement of experts needed to carry out
the most comprehensive investigation possible. Such a lack of funding calls into ques-
tion the seriousness of UN officials vis-a`-vis their commitment to protect people facing
potential and actual death and rape at the hands of those who commit crimes against
humanity and genocide. For all of the promises of ‘‘never again!’’; all of the UN-issued
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reports and statements on the need to prevent genocide and protect people from be-
coming victims of genocide;34 all the meetings, conferences, and summits by UN offi-
cials in Khartoum, Darfur, Addis Ababa, and Abuja over the years (and all of the costs
incurred for such), it seems as if the UN could have come up with enough funding
to conduct a comprehensive investigation with enough experts to do the job right.
Instead, what the UN ended up doing was conducting an investigation on the cheap,
thus neglecting to collect all the data it could or should have due to self-imposed time
constraints that were exacerbated by an inadequate number of personnel and funding
dedicated to the effort. Seemingly, it was a classic case of ‘‘fiddling while Rome—read
Darfur—burns,’’ literally!35
Ultimately, the lack of funding also calls into question just how serious the UN
was in regard to not only carrying out a thorough investigation but meeting its stated
goal of ascertaining whether or not genocide had been perpetrated against the black
Africans. Everyone is well aware of the huge UN expenditures to keep its bureaucrats
well paid, situated in nice offices in beautiful cities, housed in nice and costly abodes,
and chauffered in comfortable and expensive vehicles. Surely, for an investigation
whose focus was to ascertain whether genocide was taking place, adequate funding
could have been found if there was the will to do so.
Another concern is how the actual investigation was undertaken—that is, how the
investigators were prepared to undertake the interviews, whether the investigators
were expected to ask the same questions of all like actors (meaning, using one set
of questions for internally displaced persons, another set for Sudanese officials, and
still another for members of the rebel groups). Again, Debb Bodkin provides valuable
insights into such concerns:
During our briefing [about the COI] in Geneva, we were given no format or indication
as to how the investigation and interviews were to be conducted. As a result, every
investigator conducted his/her investigation and interviews in whatever fashion he/
she preferred. I cannot believe that with the vast difference in expertise of each in-
vestigator there would be any semblance of consistency in regard to the gathering of
evidence . . . The UN investigation did not provide any parameters whatsoever and an
untrained interviewer could easily have asked questions in a manner that would have
elicited whatever response he or she hoped to obtain.36
Again, it is unfathomable as to why a single questionnaire was not developed and
printed by the COI so that each investigator had the same set(s) of questions to ask
specific members of a group throughout the investigation.37 Having a single set of
questions for each group of interviewees would not, of course, have precluded investi-
gators from asking interviewees follow-up questions. Allowing each investigator, how-
ever, to ask his/her own questions, as the COI did, is likely to have resulted in a mish-
mash of information (whether this was the result or not is unknown for the COI report
does not comment on this matter), possibly resulting in a situation in which the full
range of human rights violations were not reported, and critical information about
ethnic slurs and threats issued by the perpetrators during the attacks possibly under-
reported and/or not even collected by certain investigators.
As for the directives provided the COI investigators, Bodkin reports that
Because I had never been involved in a UN investigation before I truly didn’t know
what was going on. We were never instructed to be anywhere at certain times so when
briefings did occur, some investigators were there and some were not . . . A few of us
took notes during the briefings, but many did not. So, as far as everyone being on the
same page about everything, impossible.38
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According to Bodkin, the briefings did not address the need to collect information
about any epithets made by the GOS troops and/or the Janjaweed during their attacks
on the black Africans. The collection of such information is, however, critical in help-
ing to establish what the perpetrators’ thoughts, purposes, and animus were toward
specific groups under attack—all of which could help to establish whether such
attacks were being perpetrated against a group as a result of their ethnicity, race,
and so on. In regard to the issue of racial epithets, Bodkin commented as follows:
I do not recall anything about the need to collect information regarding racial epithets.
But I believe that it definitely should have been. I noted [such information] in a num-
ber of my interviews because I realized the importance due to the CIJ [Coalition of
International Justice, which organized and carried out the U.S. State Department’s
ADP in Chad in July and August of 2004] questionnaire. However, I presume many of
the investigators did not know to ask a question about such matters.39
Bodkin also pointed out that once in the field, each investigator was open to choose
who they interviewed and how.40 That included asking any questions that they
thought particularly pertinent, but not asking the same set of questions.
Finally, a problem arose in regard to the background of some of the interpreters
the COI hired for the investigation. The UN reportedly hired interpreters from Arab
tribes, so the investigators had to convince the victims whom they were interviewing
that it was safe for them to speak in front of the interpreters.41 This matter, alone,
could have greatly influenced the information (or lack thereof ) collected by the COI
investigators. It is very possible that, out of fear of being reported to the GoS author-
ities, the victims were not as forthcoming about various matters as they might have
been had they had more trust that their words would not be used against them at
some future point in time. Knowing full well that the victims were being attacked by
a government that favored the Arab population and that there was a distinct possibil-
ity that some interpreters could be in the pocket of the GoS, it makes no sense at all
for the UN to have hired Arabs as interpreters.
A Shoddy or Skewed Analysis?
Since the express purpose of the UN’s Commission of Inquiry in Darfur was to ascertain
whether or not the government of Sudan had perpetrated genocide against the black
Africans of Darfur, this section focuses on the evidence collected by the COI, the analy-
sis of the evidence, and the rationale used in making the determination that crimes
against humanity, not genocide, had been perpetrated in Darfur.42 Under the heading
entitled ‘‘Have Acts of Genocide Occurred?’’ the authors of the report state the following:
The Commission concluded that the Government of the Sudan has not pursued a policy
of genocide. Arguably, two elements of genocide might be deduced from the gross viola-
tions of human rights perpetrated by Government forces and the militias under their
control. These two elements are, first, the actus reus consisting of killing, or causing
serious bodily or mental harm, or deliberately inflicting conditions of life likely to bring
about physical destruction; and, second, on the basis of a subjective standard, the exis-
tence of a protected group being targeted by the authors of criminal conduct. However,
the crucial element of genocidal intent appears to be missing, at least as far as the cen-
tral government authorities are concerned. Generally speaking the policy of attacking,
killing and forcibly displacing members of some tribes does not evince a specific intent
to annihilate, in whole or in part, a group distinguished on racial, ethnic, national or
religious grounds. Rather, it would seem that those who planned and organized attacks
on villages pursued the intent to drive the victims from their homes primarily for the
purpose of counter-insurgency warfare.43
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Prior to addressing the issue of intent, there is a need to address the problematic
nature of the following assertion in the above statement: ‘‘the crucial element of geno-
cidal intent appears to be missing, at least as far as the central government authorities
are concerned.’’44 The problem is that the COI was not given the sole task of determin-
ing whether or not the GoS committed genocide. It was responsible for investigating
‘‘reports of violations of international humanitarian and human rights law in Darfur
by all parties, [and] to determine whether or not acts of genocide have occurred.’’45
What, then, about the Janjaweed and their actions? Did their actions amount to geno-
cide? The way in which the language is couched, it sounds as if the Commissioners are
suggesting that that is a distinct possibility. If the Commissioners believed that the
Janjaweed were responsible for genocidal actions, if not outright genocide, then that
should have been boldly and clearly stated in the report.46
Furthermore, if the Janjaweed did commit genocide then the GoS is still culpable
because the Janjaweed were recruited, outfitted, and paid by the GOS to help carry
out the attacks.47 This goes directly to the issue of command responsibility.48
Concomitantly, since the Janjaweed and GoS worked hand-in-hand in carrying
out a vast majority of the attacks, there is no way—without outright lying—that the
government can claim it did not know what the Janjaweed were doing throughout
2003 to early 2005. Concomitantly, the GoS cannot—at least not legitimately—blame
the attacks on the Janjaweed alone. Not only were the hundreds of attacks largely
carried out in the same fashion, but Janjaweed frequently rode on GoS vehicles
(Land-Cruisers) during the attacks. So, it must be asked, did the COI purposely avoid
accusing the Janjaweed of genocide in order to avoid casting aspersions on the GoS? If
so, that constitutes simply one more flaw in the COI’s determination that genocide
had not been perpetrated in Darfur.
Now for the issue of intent. Again, the key question is this: Was there the intent to
destroy, in whole or in part, a national, ethnical, racial, or religious group as such?
There is no doubt that the issue of intent is, generally, the stickiest issue in determin-
ing whether or not genocide has been perpetrated.49
Most ge´nocidaires are wily enough not to leave a written or oral record of their in-
tentions. Indeed, most know better than to record their genocidal intentions in formal
government records or statements, issue their genocidal directives via written orders,
broadcast directives over radio and television (unless they simply do not care and/or
are intent on calling on all actors to take part in the killing, as was the case in
Rwanda in 1994 when Radio-Television Mille Collines urged all Hutu to kill all Tutsi).
But, it is also true that intent can be ascertained from the events unfolding on the
ground. For example, the ICC Elements of Crimes states that ‘‘existence of intent
and knowledge can be inferred from relevant facts and circumstances.’’50
After asserting that ‘‘the policy of attacking, killing and forcibly displacing mem-
bers of some tribes does not evince a specific intent to annihilate, in whole or in part, a
group distinguished on racial, ethnic, national or religious grounds,’’ the COI goes on
to argue that the main purpose of the GoS was to drive the black Africans from their
homes and villages ‘‘primarily for purposes of counter-insurgency warfare.’’51 As part
and parcel of explaining its determination, the COI report goes into great detail as to
what could constitute proof of genocidal intent. In doing so, it cites various cases at
the International Criminal Tribunal for Rwanda (ICTR) and the International Crimi-
nal Tribunal for the former Yugoslavia (ICTY). For example, it states that ‘‘whenever
direct evidence of genocidal intent is lacking, as is mostly the case, this intent can be
inferred from many acts and manifestations or factual circumstances.’’52 Further-
more, in the Jelisic case at the ICTY, the appeals chamber noted that
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as to proof of specific intent, it may, in the absence of direct explicit evidence, be
inferred from a number of facts and circumstances, such as the general context, the
perpetration of other culpable acts systematically directed against the same group,
the scale of atrocities committed, the systematic targeting of victims on account of their
membership of a particular group, or the repetition of destructive and discriminatory
acts.53
The report goes on to say,
A number of factors from which intent may be inferred were mentioned in Akayesu
523–4: ‘‘the general context of the perpetration of other culpable acts systematically
directed against that same group where . . . committed by the same offender or by
others’’; ‘‘the scale of atrocities committed’’; the ‘‘general nature’’ of the atrocities com-
mitted ‘‘in a region or a country’’; ‘‘the fact of deliberately and systematically targeting
victims on account of their membership of a particular group, while excluding the mem-
bers of other groups’’; ‘‘the general political doctrine which gave rise to the acts’’; ‘‘the
repetition of destructive and discriminatory acts’’ or ‘‘the perpetration of acts which
violate, or which the perpetrators themselves consider to violate, the very foundations
of the group—acts which are not in themselves covered by the list . . . but which are com-
mitted as part of the same pattern of conduct, in Musema (166) as well as Kayishema
and Ruzindana (93 and 527): ‘‘the number of group members affected’’; ‘‘the physical
targeting of the group or their property’’; ‘‘the use of derogatory language toward mem-
bers of the targeted group’’; ‘‘the weapons employed and the extent of bodily injury’’;
‘‘the methodical way of planning’’; ‘‘the systematic manner of killing’’ and the propor-
tionate scale of the actual or attempted destruction of a group.’’54
A number of these factors were evident during the course of events involving the GoS
troops and the Janjaweed in Darfur between 2003 and January 2005, which I outline
here:
1. The perpetration of culpable acts systematically directed against the same
group committed by the same offender or by others
Over and above the systematic bombings and shootings of the black Africans by the
perpetrators, the perpetrators committed the following acts time and again in a fairly
systematic manner between early 2003 and early 2005: (1) poisoned wells by throwing
dead human bodies and/or the carcasses of animals into them, which, in certain areas
of Darfur that reach 90 to 130 degrees Farenheit, constitutes an effort to deprive the
people of a basic source of sustenance; (2) blocked humanitarian aid from entering
internally displaced persons camps, thus preventing desperately needed food, water,
and medical supplies from reaching those in dire need; and (3) raped an untold num-
ber of girls and women.55
2. Scale of atrocities committed
The estmate of the number of those killed as a result of bombings, shootings, or stab-
bings and as a result of a lack of water or medical treatment after having been
wounded ranged from a low of 120,000 to a high of 400,000.56 The UN largely settled
on the number of 200,000.57 Since the government of Sudan continually blocked
efforts by researchers to enter Darfur, it was (and continues to be) impossible to
make an exact determination of the number who perished as a result of the attacks.
While the number of black Africans who had been killed by the time of the COI inves-
tigation was certainly much, much lower than those who died in the Holocaust, Cam-
bodia, or Rwanda, close to a quarter of a million dead is not insignificant.
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3. The systematic targeting of victims on account of their membership of a
particular group
It is irrefutable that the GOS and the Janjaweed targeted, specifically and solely, the
black Africans of Darfur (particularly the Massaleit, Zaghawa, and the Fur). Hun-
dreds upon hundreds of their villages were attacked, looted, and burned to the ground
and their crops and orchards were destroyed. Black African villagers reported seeing
and hearing attacks on villages miles away, knowing that it was only a matter of time
before their own village would be attacked in much the same way (and that is exactly
what happened). Month after month throughout 2003, 2004, and early 2005, attacks
were carried out on a regular basis against black African villages, while their non-
black African neighbors were largely unscathed.58
Concomitantly, in one attack after another, black African females (some as young
as eight years old) were raped and gang-raped by the Janjaweed and the GoS troops,
thus constituting another aspect of ‘‘the systematic targeting of victims on account of
their membership of a particular group.’’
4. The general political doctrine that gave rise to the acts
It is well known that the government of Sudan is an adherent of so-called Arab
supremacism and supportive of the Arab Gathering. More specifically,
In Darfur, the first signs of an Arab racist ideology emerged in the early 1980s . . .
Around this time, leaflets and cassette recordings purporting to come from a group call-
ing itself the Arab Gathering began to be distributed anonymously, proclaiming that
the zurga [a derogatory term equivalent to the word ‘‘nigger’’ that is used by some to
debase black Africans] had ruled Darfur long enough and it was time for Arabs to
have their turn. The speakers claimed that Arabs constituted a majority in Darfur
and should therefore prepare themselves to take over the regional government—by
force if necessary . . . The notion of Arab superiority had been a feature of northern
Sudanese society for centuries, but this was something new. This was militant and
inflammatory.59
5. The perpetration of acts which violate, or which the perpetrators themselves
consider to violate, the very foundations of the group [and] which are
committed as part of the same pattern of conduct
Three main acts perpetrated by GoS troops and the Janjaweed are germane to this
issue: the mass rape of black African females, the poisoning of the wells, and the effort
to block humanitarian goods from reaching those in internally displaced persons
camps. Individual rape, mass rape, and other types of sexual violence by GOS forces
and the Janjaweed against black African females, both during the attacks on villages
and on females venturing outside of IDP camps, were regular occurrences.60
Furthermore, a great amount of testimony collected by the ADP, various human
rights groups, and the press attest to the fact that comments made by the rapists sug-
gest that the rape was perpetrated, at least in part, as a direct attack on the racial
and ethnic identities of the black African females. More specifically, various black
African survivors have reported the following:
It happened last August [2004] when we were in our farms outside the village [in West
Darfur]. We [three black African women, ages 25, 30, and 40] saw five Arab men who
came to us . . . [They] told us that we should have sex with them. We said no. So they
beat and raped us. After they abused us, they told us that now we would have Arab
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babies; and if they would find any Fur woman, they would rape them, [too,] to change
the colour of their children.61 In the town of Mukjara, two men separately described
women being brought into a prison where they were being held and raped for hours by
Janjaweed. They said the assailants said that they were ‘‘planting tomatoes’’—the
reference to skin red’’ because they are slightly lighter-skinned than ethnic Africans.62
A Fur male reported that in December 2003, a few months before his village in West
Darfur (near El Geneina) was attacked, Janjaweed raped his daughter and two other
girls (ages 14, 15, 16) and said, ‘‘We will take your women and make them ours. We
will change the race.’’63 During a ground attack in western Darfur (near Seleya) in
November 2003, a Eregnan man reported hearing, ‘‘We will kill all men and rape
women. We want to change the color. Every woman will deliver red. Arabs [will be]
the husbands of those women.’’64
The perpetrators knew that by raping female black Africans they were creating
pariahs who would be shunned by their families and fellow villagers; that young girls
and women who were not married would be hard pressed to find husbands as a result
of having been defiled; and that any babies born of the rapes would result in ‘‘red’’ or
‘‘lighter’’ babies who would not be considered black African but Arab and that they,
too, would be considered pariahs within the larger community.65
In discussing the the ostensible reasons or purposes for the perpetration of the
mass and gang rapes, the COI concluded: ‘‘The patterns appear to indicate that rape
and sexual violence have been used by the Janjaweed and Government soldiers (or at
least with their complicity) as a delibrate strategy with a view to achieve certain
objectives including terrorizing the population, ensuring control over the movement
of the IDP population and perpetuating its displacement. [Certain cases] demonstrate
that rape was used as a means to demoralize and humiliate the population.’’66 It is
astonishing that the Commissioners limited the possible purposes of the mass and
gang rape of the black African females to the above. More specifically, issuing racial
slurs (and threats to make ‘‘lighter’’ and ‘‘red babies’’) during the mass rape of the
black African females, making threats to exterminate all of the black Africans as
they raped the black African females, and perpetrating mass rape knowing full well
the stigma attached to a female who has been raped in a Muslim society all suggest
that the perpetrators did, in fact, have the intent, to destroy, at least in part, a specific
group of people.
Furthermore, in all likelihood, girls and women who have been raped by a GoS
soldier or a Janjaweed, if not a horde of rapists, suffer each and every day of their lives
as a result of being raped. Indeed, one has to wonder how they even manage to go on
with daily life having both been raped (not once, which is horrific enough, but often
gang raped many times over for days and weeks on end) and forced to witness the
rape of other girls and women (including their mothers, daughters, sisters, and aunts).
The COI, itself, provides information about a victim who was raped ‘‘14 times over the
period of one week.’’67 If the latter situation (and others like it) is not likely to ‘‘caus[e]
serious . . . mental harm to members of the group,’’68 then what is?
In regard to the GoS’s response to the mass rape in Darfur, the Commissioners state
that ‘‘on their part, the [GoS] authorities failed to address the allegations of rape ade-
quately or effectively.’’69 Unfortunately, and ironically, the very same accusation can,
and should, be made of the COI. This is true because the Commissioners certainly had
to be cognizant of all of the above information (i.e, the racial slurs, the threats to make
different color babies, the threats to exterminate the black African people, the stimga
attached to rape in such a culture, and the killing of the babies), and at least be some-
what aware of how the trauma of being raped never subsides in a victim’s mind and
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heart (e.g., those who suffer rape may relive the horror of the attack[s], which can result
in crying jags, a sense of violation that never ends, severe and prolonged depression,
the very questioning of the worth of life itself, suicical thoughts, attempts at suicide,
and a fear of being alone and/or around males they do not know).
Tellingly, the International Criminal Tribunal for Rwanda (ICTR) found Jean-
Paul Akayesu guilty of genocide for overseeing the rape of Tutsi females during the
1994 Rwandan genocide. More specifically, he was convicted on the following grounds:
The rape of Tutsi women was systematic and was perpetrated against all Tutsi women
and solely against them. A Tutsi woman, married to a Hutu, testified before the Cham-
ber that she was not raped because her ethnic background was unknown . . . The Inter-
ahamwe who raped Alexia said, as he threw her on the ground and got on top of her,
‘‘let us now see what the vagina of a Tutsi woman tastes like.’’ Akayesu himself, speak-
ing to the Interahamwe who were committing the rapes, said to them: ‘‘don’t ever ask
again what a Tutsi woman tastes like.’’ This sexualized representation of ethnic identity
graphically illustrates that Tutsi women were subjected to sexual violence because they
were Tutsi. Sexual violence was a step in the process of destruction of the Tutsi group—
destruction of the spirit, of the will to live, and of life itself. 70
By substituting the words ‘‘black Africans’’ or ‘‘Massaliet, Zaghawa or Fur’’ for Tutsi
and ‘‘Janjaweed’’ for ‘‘Interahamwe,’’ the explanation aptly describes the intent of the
rapists in Darfur and the resultant horrors experienced by their female victims.71
Ultimately, though, the COI concluded the following:
It is apparent from the information collected and verified by the Commission that rape
or other forms of sexual violence committed by the Janjaweed and Government soldiers
in Darfur was widespread and systematic and may thus well amount to a crime against
humanity . . . It further finds that . . . in some instances the crimes committed in Darfur
may amount to the crime of sexual slavery as a crime against humanity. Futhermore,
the Commission finds that the fact that rape and others forms of sexual violence were
conducted mainly against three ‘‘African’’ tribes is indicative of the discriminatory in-
tent of the perpetrators. The Commission therefore finds that the elements of persecu-
tion as a crime against humanity may also be present.72
When all is said and done, and as delineated above, both the context (e.g., the racial
slurs, the intent to make different color babies, the threats of extermination) and
ramifications of the rapes (the potential and severe ostracism faced by those girls and
women who have been raped at the hands of the GOS troops and Janjaweed, for exam-
ple, outright rejection of the victims by family and community members) are largely
ignored by the COI. Oddly, the very real possibility of contracting and spreading the
AIDS/HIV virus is also ignored. Granted, a final determination by a court as to what
all of this constitutes is needed, but the COI’s stance still leads one to wonder if there
was a purposeful disregard of such contextual issues and their ramifications—as well
as the skirting the fact that, in one way or another, such acts might constitute genocide.
Over and above the mass rape of black African females, there was another
attempt by the GoS troops and Janjaweed to destroy the black Africans in whole or
in part and that was stealing and destroying most of the essentials black Africans
needed for sustaining their lives. The COI report actually comments on this issue:
A particular pattern recorded by the Commission was the fact that the IDPs and refu-
gees interviewed would place great emphasis on the crime of looting, and explain that
the Janjaweed had taken everything these persons had owned, involving all goods
necessary to sustain life in the difficult conditions in Darfur, including pans, cups,
and clothes, as well as livestock, representing the key source of income of the affected
people.73
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The COI report goes on to assert that ‘‘the Commission found that the majority of
cases involving looting were carried out by the Janjaweed and in a few cases by the
Government forces. Looting was mainly carried out against African tribes and usually
targeted property necessary for the survival and livelihood of these tribes.’’74 Thus, even
the COI readily acknowledges that the survival of the black Africans was left in the
balance as a result of such thievery. Such actions seemingly fall under Article 2c of
the UN Convention on the Prevention and Punishment of the Crime of Genocide
(UNCG): ‘‘deliberately inflicting on the group conditions of life calculated to bring
about its physical destruction in whole or in part.’’ Again, though, the COI does not
comment on such actions as they relate or do not relate to the issue of genocide.
Rather, the COI calls the actions ‘‘war crimes’’ and asserts that they possibly consti-
tute ‘‘a form of persecution as a crime against humanity.’’75 It just does not seem
that the concept/crime of genocide was within the worldview of the COI.76
6. The methodical planning of the attacks and atrocities
There are numerous indications that the planning by the GoS and Janjaweed was
methodical. First, time and again, the attacks were generally carried out in the same
manner against hundreds of villages all over Darfur.77 Someone had to plan the flight
patterns and arrivals of the Antonovs and helicopter gunships and synchronize the
arrival of the Antonovs and gunships with that of the Janjaweed on horseback and
camels and the GoS and Janjaweed on land cruisers. Furthermore, in some cases,
villagers reported being tricked into toting all of their worldly goods to a central loca-
tion purportedly to be taxed only to be attacked by the GoS and Janjaweed, which
allowed for quick and easy theft of all the black African’s goods. This happened to
one village and town after another on designated days.78 Finally, there is ample evi-
dence that the GoS has whitewashed planes and affixed UN insignias on such planes
in order to offload both men and materiel in Darfur. Again, such flights take coordina-
tion and planning.
7. Systematic manner of killing
Ample documentation exists that shows the killings took place day after day, week
after week, and month after month in the three states of Darfur.79 Furthermore, a
vast majority of the attacks generally followed the same pattern with Antonovs bomb-
ing the fields and villages of black Africans early in the morning, which were followed
up by hundreds of Janjaweed racing into villages on camels and horses and then GoS
soldiers (often accompanied by Janjaweed) on four wheel vehicles and dushkas (four
wheel vehicles with mounted automatic weapons). During the initial part of the
attacks, men and older boys were often the target of killing while women and girls
were often raped. Almost at once, the villages were ransacked and then torched as
the black Africans were chased out into the forbidding hinterland. Before leaving the
villages, the perpetrators often tossed the carcasses of dead animals and the bodies
of dead black Africans into the wells in order to poison the water. In certain cases,
black African men were rounded up and killed en masse in various areas such as in
Mukjar.80
So, those are the hard facts. In light of the hurried nature of the COI investigation, it
is natural to wonder about how much time, care and depth of thought went into the
analysis of the data collected by the COI team and how much care and thought went
into wrestling with what the findings added up to in the end. No one but those who
conducted the analysis knows for sure, but this is what Bodkin had to say:
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First, there is absolutely no way that there was any sort of consistent body of informa-
tion submitted to the Commissioners. Also, in my humble opinion, unless they stayed
awake 24 hours a day from Jan. 19–31 to read all the reports that we submitted, I do
not see how the five Commissioners actually went through all of the information. It
angered me so much when I read the report that I can honestly say I have never gotten
through it in its entirety. Is HOGWASH a known legal term?81
Ultimately, in light of so much evidence that suggests the GoS and the Janjaweed
were intent on destroying in whole or in part the black Africans, the major question
that remains is: Exactly what sort of policy, evidence, and actions would evince—for
the COI Commissioners—a specific intent to destroy, in whole or in part, a group dis-
tinguished on racial, ethnic, national, or religious grounds? More deaths? More racial
and ethnic slurs? More wells poisoned? More humanitarian goods stolen or prevented
from reaching those who are destitute, dying, and internally displaced? A smoking
gun? The COI does not say.
The COI’s Skewed Rationale for Not Coming to a
Determination of Genocide
In a section entitled ‘‘Do the Crimes Perpetrated in Darfur Constitute Acts of Geno-
cide,’’ the COI report provides a rationale for its determination that the GOS troops
and Janjaweed had not committed genocide. It opens with the following:
There is no doubt that some of the objective elements of genocide materialized in Darfur.
. . . The Commission has collected substantial and reliable materials which tends to
show the occurrence of systematic killing of civilians belonging to particular tribes, of
large-scale causing of serious bodily or mental harm to members of the population
belonging to certain tribes, and of massive and deliberate infliction on those tribes of
conditions of life bringing about their physical destruction in whole or in part (for exam-
ple by systematically destroying their villages and crops, by expelling them from their
homes, and by looting their cattle).82
However, it then goes on to assert the following:
Some elements emerging from the facts including the scale of atrocities and the system-
atic nature of the attacks, killing, displacement and rape, as well as racially motivated
statements by perpetrators that have targeted members of the African tribes only, could
be indicative of the genocidal intent. However, there are other more indicative elements
that show the lack of genocidal intent.83
Ironically, while the evidence produced by the COI indicating genocidal intent is
strong and convincing, the ‘‘evidence’’ it produces to question genocidal intent verges
on the absurd. More specifically, the COI notes and argues: ‘‘[It is a] fact that in a
number of villages attacked and burned by both militias and Government forces the
attackers refrained from exterminating the whole population that had not fled, but
instead selectively killed groups of young men . . .’’84 This line of thinking makes it
seem as if the COI is totally ignorant of the UNCG definition of genocide and its word-
ing, which states: ‘‘In the present Convention, genocide means any of the following
acts committed with intent to destroy, in whole or in part, a national, ethnical, racial
or religious group, as such.’’85 No genocide in modern times has resulted in extermi-
nating the whole population—not the Armenian genocide, not the Holocaust, not the
Cambodian genocide, not the Rwandan genocide. The COI also infers that the only
individuals targeted for death were rebels or potential rebels, but there is ample
evidence that everyone from infants to 100-plus-year-old men (and everyone in
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between—girls, women, young boys) were killed; and individuals who were black
Africans were targeted and killed as well.86
Continuing its argument, the COI next provides what it perceives as an example
of the GoS’s lack of intent to commit genocide against a group (in this case an ethnic
group) protected under the UNCG. More specifically, it cites an attack in January
2004 in which the perpetrators rounded up all those black Africans who had survived
the attack and not escaped into the mountains and desert. Scanning a list with nu-
merous names, the perpetrators selected fifteen individuals, including seven omdas,87
and killed them outright. Later, the perpetrators killed another 205 villagers who
they asserted were rebels. Reportedly, they allowed some 800 others to remain alive.
Subsequently, the COI argues that ‘‘[t]his case clearly shows that the intent of the
attack was not to destroy an ethnic group as such, or part of the group. Instead, the
intention was to murder all those men they considered as rebels, as well as forcibly
expel the whole population so as to vacate the villages and prevent rebels from hiding
among, or getting support from, the local population.’’88 This line of thinking is faulty
on several counts. First, the COI seems to take at face value the assertion by the GoS
that those who were murdered were rebels. Time and again, the GoS has shown its
true colors by lying to the international community, its own people, representatives
of different states, and the press, among others. It has, for example, repeatedly denied
its responsibility for the ongoing crisis in Darfur;89 denied that it carried out ethnic
cleansing or atrocities approaching extermination;90 and denied that it backs the
Arab militias.91 It has also repeatedly and drastically minimized the number of dead
in Darfur. So, why anyone, let alone an investigatory group attempting to ascertain
whether the GoS had perpetrated genocide or not, would rely on assertions by GoS
personnel is baffling.
Furthermore, as Fowler cogently argues, ‘‘The Commission’s reference to the fact
that the perpetrators did not ‘exterminat[e] the whole population’ is puzzling . . . The
Commission itself had explained in a previous paragraph that international case law
establishes that ‘the intent to destroy a group in part’ requires the intention to destroy
a ‘considerable number or individuals’ or ‘a substantial part . . .’92 The Commis-
sion failed to offer any reason why two hundred twenty-seven out of twelve hundred
[actually, it was out of just over 1,000] is neither a ‘considerable number of indivi-
duals’ (in relation to that sample) nor ‘a substantial part’ of that sample, especially
when the community leadership was particularly targeted.’’93
Fowler also addresses the COI’s assertion that the GOS’s primary objective was to
kill rebels and force those who were suspected of harboring rebels out of the area:
[T]he Commission . . . distinguished[ed] between ‘‘the intent to destroy an ethnic group
as such’’ and ‘‘the intention to murder all those men they considered to be rebels . . . ,’’
[y]et, on just the previous page, the Commission had included a number of quotes in
which the perpetrators used ethnic identity, racial epithets, and terms like Torabora
(slang for rebels) interchangeably. The whole point of the government’s campaign
against the civilian population of the the non-Arab ethnic groups was equating ethnic-
ity with rebellion, rendering it nonsensical to distinguish an intent to destroy those
ethnic groups from an intent to murder rebels. The targets were, by the Government’s
apparent definition, one and the same.94
According to the COI, the second element that demonstrates the GOS’s lack of
genocidal intent was that after the black Africans’ villages were destroyed the black
African survivors were ‘‘collected in IDP camps’’: ‘‘In other words, the population sur-
viving attacks on villages are not killed outright, so as to eradicate the group; they are
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rather forced to abandon their homes and live together in areas selected by the Gov-
ernment.’’95 There are numerous problems with this line of thinking as well. First,
many of the black Africans ended up in makeshift camps in barren desert that they
‘‘selected’’ and erected. Second, hundreds of thousands of black Africans, out of sheer
fear, fled to Chad. Third, if the the COI had existed between 1915 and 1919, would it
have argued that the Ottoman Turks had not commited genocide due to the fact that
‘‘the [Armenian] population surviving attacks . . . [were] not killed outright, so as to
eradicate the group; [rather, they were] forced to abandon their homes and live
together in areas (e.g., the vast wasteland of Deir et Zor) selected by the Govern-
ment’’? Or, in the case of the deportation of the Jews to ghettos, concentration camps,
and death camps, would the COI have offered the same argument about the tens of
thousands of Jewish survivors who ended up in displaced persons camps at the end
of World War II? As Fowler argues: ‘‘This element begs the question of whether the
direct violence (i.e., murdering and raping) was of sufficient scale to evince the intent
to destroy the targeted groups ‘in part,’ even though there are survivors who are not
murdered outright. And the Commission offers no rationale why this element would
be more indicative of intent than the scale and systematic nature of direct violence.’’96
Eric Reeves, a scholar at Smith College in Northampton, Massachusetts, who has
written extensively on the crisis in Darfur, is also highly critical of the COI’s assertion
about the internally displaced:
This is an incomplete, finally deeply inaccurate characterization of the realities of
internal displacement in Darfur (and into Chad). First, . . . mortality is exceedingly
high following violent displacement . . . Of note here is a singularly important study of
traumatic and early post-traumatic mortality resulting from violent displacement,
published in The Lancet by authors from Doctors Without Borders/Medecins Sans
Frontieres and others97 . . . Secondly, a very large percentage of the displaced popula-
tion . . . have been forced to flee into inaccessible rural areas presently beyond the reach
of any humanitarian relief efforts. They are dying in great numbers . . . Moreover, to
claim that ‘‘Government of Sudan generally allows humanitarian organizations to
help the population in camps by providing food, clean water, medicines and logistical
assistance’’ is a shocking distortion of the truth, if we look back as far as November/
December 2003 (certainly a period of time within the purview of the Commission’s
investigation). At the time, Tom Vraalsen, UN special envoy for humanitarian affairs
in Sudan, declared in a memo to the UN humanitarian coordinator for Sudan (Mukesh
Kapila) that Khartoum was ‘‘systematically’’ denying access to areas in which non-
Arab/African tribal populations were concentrated.98
Continuing its argument that the establishment of the IDP camps was proof that
the GoS did not intend to commit genocide, the COI claims, ‘‘This is all the more true
because the living conditions in those camps, although open to strong criticism on
many grounds, do not seem to be calculated to bring about the extinction of the ethnic
group to which the IDPs belong.’’99 Once again, the COI seems to believe that deter-
mination of genocide can only be made when it involves the total eradication of the
group or, as it says, its extinction. The aforementioned statement by the COI blatantly
disregards the fact that many thousands of internally displaced peoples were bereft
when it came to food, water, shelter, and medicine. It also blatantly ignores the fact
that the GoS repeatedly and aggressively interfered with the work of humanitarian
groups, including the creation of administrative delays; harassing, threatening
and intimidating humanitarian personnel; arresting humanitarian personnel;100 and
blocking entrance to camps thus preventing humanitarian aid from reaching the
refugees.101
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Finally, the COI report relates an incident in which the Janjaweed attacked a
village and shot and killed a man who resisted their attempt to steal his camel but
didn’t kill the man’s brother during their theft of his 200 camels. Based on this single
instance involving two black Africans, the COI authors wildly and absurdly surmise
the following: ‘‘Clearly, in this instance the special intent to kill a member of a group
to destroy the group as such was lacking, the murder being only motivated by the
desire to appropriate cattle belonging to the inhabitants of the village. Irrespective of
the motive, had the attackers’ intent been to annihilate the group, they would not
have spared one of the brothers.’’102 The use of an example involving two men out of
literally millions affected by the attacks is not only ludicrous but irresponsible.
Indeed, this argument by the COI exemplifies the shoddy thinking inherent in its
ultimate determination.103
What Standard of Evidence Was Needed for a COI
Finding of Genocide?
In an attempt to explain its final determination that the GoS and the Janjaweed per-
petrated crimes against humanity but not genocide, the COI asserted, ‘‘Courts and
other bodies charged with establishing whether genocide has occurred must be very
careful in the determination of subjective intent . . . Convictions for genocide can be
entered only where intent has been unequivocally established.’’104 Fowler, who is a
Stanford University educated lawyer, raises an important issue that calls into ques-
tion, once again, the logic used by the authors of the COI report:
[T]his standard [beyond a reasonable doubt] is clearly wrong under these circumstan-
ces. The Commission was not a court of law, nor was it adjudicating the fate of indivi-
dual defendants. The liberty of an accused defendant did not turn on its decision. Quite
to the contrary, the Commission was only called upon to make a threshold finding on
the basis of which the UN Security Council would decide whether to take additional
action, including referring the situation to the International Criminal Court (ICC) for
a full-fledged criminal investigation.
A review of the ICC Statute makes clear the Commission’s error in applying the
‘‘beyond reasonable doubt’’ standard. The Statute contemplates several stages through
which a case proceeds, each stage requiring that a separate weight of evidence be met.
When a situation is referred to the ICC, the Prosecutor is required to initiate an inves-
tigation unless ‘‘there is no reasonable basis to proceed’’ (Art. 51.1). Having conducted
an investigation, the Prosecutor may seek an arrest warrant if he/she can establish
‘‘reasonable grounds to believe that the person has committed a crime within the juris-
diction of the Court’’ (Art. 58). The Court next is called upon to confirm the charges,
which it will do if the Prosecutor offers ‘‘sufficient evidence to establish substantial
grounds to believe that the person committed the crime charged’’ (Art. 61) [emphasis
added]. Finally, at trial, an individual can only be convicted if the Court is ‘‘convinced
of the guilt of the accused beyond reasonable doubt’’ (Art. 66.3) [emphasis in original].
Between ‘‘no reasonable basis to proceed’’ and beyond reasonable doubt’’ lies a con-
tinuum in which the required weight of evidence steadily, and appropriately, mounts
as the process moves forward. To eliminate that continuum and require a Prosecutor to
establish guilt beyond a reasonable doubt as a condition of launching an investigation
would be nonsensical. Yet that is the standard of proof apparently applied by the Com-
mission, in spite of the fact that its investigation was prefatory to any judicial action
[emphasis added]. The Commission’s application of this standard is all the more erro-
neous in light of the constraints placed upon it by the amount of time available as well
as the continued commission of the very crimes it was supposed to investigate. It was
not in any conceivable position to reach a conclusion ‘‘beyond reasonable doubt’’ on an
issue as complex and problematic as genocidal intent.105
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It is hard to believe that Cassesse and his team, along with the bevy of lawyers
that could have provided advice to the Commission, were not cognizant of the various
points that Fowler makes. If they were, then why did they settle on the ‘‘beyond a rea-
sonable doubt’’ argument? Was it a case of planned subterfuge? If they weren’t cogni-
zant of the various points Fowler makes then that calls into question their very level
of expertise, which subsequently calls into question the validity of their analysis of the
data collected by their investigators.
Conclusion
Following its determination that the atrocities committed by the GoS and the Janja-
weed amounted to crimes against humanity but not genocide, the COI recommended
that the UN Security Council refer the crisis in Darfur to the International Criminal
Court (ICC). Subsequently, on 31 March 2005, the Security Council, in a vote of 11–0,
referred the matter to the ICC. Four countries abstained from voting, including China
and the United States. It was the first time the Security Council had, as a result of
a vote, referred a matter to the ICC. The ICC then began its own investigation into
the Darfur crisis. On 14 July 2008, the ICC filed charges against President Omar al-
Bashir for having perpetrated crimes against humanity and genocide. Subsequently,
Bashir asserted that the ICC did not have the jurisdiction to charge him, decried the
charges as ‘‘sheer lies,’’ and swore that he would not allow himself to be tried by the
ICC. Time will tell.
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